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POINT I COUNTERPOINT 
ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS: HOW THE COURTS 
HONORED THE SEPARATION OF POWERS BY 
RECONSIDERING MIRANDA 
NEAL DEVINSt 
INTRODUCTION 
By putting an end to a thirty-five year campaign to nullify Miranda 
v. Arizona, 1 did the federal judiciary engage in inappropriate judicial 
activism or appropriate judicial restraint? 
At first blush, the answer to this question seems simple, namely: 
the Miranda override litigation is an obvious, blatant example of judi-
cial overreaching. In deciding whether Congress could statutorily nul-
lify Miranda, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Supreme 
Court both reached out to decide an issue that simply was not a part 
of the case. Neither party to the case, Dickerson v. United States,2 called 
attention to a 1968 statute3 providing that police need not issue 
Miranda warnings.4 Instead, both sides agreed that Miranda was the 
appropriate benchmark in weighing the admissibility of a confession.5 
Consequently, by first looking to the 1968 statute, not Miranda, to sort 
t Goodrich Professor of Law and Lecturer in Government, College of William and 
Mary. Special thanks are owed to James Beers for exceptional research assistance as 
well as Tammy Meyer and Char Riec for their research help. For generous comments, 
I thank Susan Bandes, Mike Dorf, Scott Idleman, Neal Katyal, John McGinnis, Mike 
Paulsen, Sai Prakash, Bob Pushaw, and Connie Taylor. Thanks also to numerous Wil-
liam and Mary colleagues who read and commented on a draft of this paper at a works-
in-progress colloquium; in particular, John Duffy played an instrumental role in the 
crafting of this essay. I also benefited from comments at faculty workshops at Washing-
ton & Lee and Boston College law schools. Finally, I want to thank Erwin Chemerinsky 
both for serving as such a wonderful foil in this point/ counterpoint and for being such 
a good friend. 
l 384 u.s. 436 (1966). 
~ 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000). 
~ Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994) 
(held unconstitutional by Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000)). 
~ 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000). 
,, ld. 
(251) 
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out the admissibility of a confession, the Fourth Circuit committed 
plain error. Mter all, a central tenet of our adversarial system is that 
(save for jurisdictional issues) the parties to a case-not the judges 
deciding the case-raise the legal arguments.6 For its part, the Su-
preme Court, by granting certiorari to decide the constitutionality of 
the 1968 statute, played fast and loose with the Constitution's "case or 
controversy" requirement. 7 With neither party willing to defend the 
statute,8 the Justices-to preserve the semblance of an adversarial dis-
pute-appointed counsel to argue the "government's side" of the 
9 
case. 
This characterization of Dickerson is widely shared. In particular, 
depicting the Fourth Circuit as "'an assistant teeing up issues for the 
Supreme Court and scouting new enemies to conquer'"10 and "the 
flagship of the federal judiciary's increasingly aggressive conservative 
wing, ,u academics and journalists alike have savaged the appellate 
court for sua sponte considering the 1968 statute.12 Complaining that 
6 At an early stage in the litigation, the Justice Department argued that the Dicker-
son confession was admissible under the 1968 statute. Pretrial Rehearing Brief for the 
United States at 2 n.1, United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999) (No. 
97-4750) (copy on file with author). By the time Dickerson made its way to the appellate 
court, however, the government elected to limit its arguments to Miranda, not the 1968 
statute. See Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 680-81 (noting the government did not brief the ap-
plicability of§ 3501 on appeal). 
7 U.S. CONST. art III, § 2. 
8 Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 578 (1999) (mem). 
9 Jd. Technically, the Court appointed Paul Cassell "amicus curiae" to defend the 
constitutionality of the 1968 statute. Jd. ("Paul G. Cassell, Esquire, of Salt Lake City, 
Utah, is invited to brief and argue this case, as amicus curiae, in support of the judg-
ment below."). Cassell, a University of Utah law professor and Washington Legal 
Foundation lawyer, has dedicated himself to the undoing of Miranda through the writ-
ing of articles and the filing of briefs. See Terry Carter, The Man ~Wzo Would Undo 
Miranda, ABA J., Mar. 2000, at 44 (profiling Cassell). Before the Fourth Circuit, 
moreover, Cassell sought and was granted permission to defend the statute through 
the filing of an amicus brief and the presentation of oral arguments. See Dickerson, 166 
F.3d at 680-81 n.14 (explaining why it granted the Washington Legal Foundation's mo-
tion to participate in the Dickerson litigation). 
10 Brooke A Masters, 4th Circuit Pushing to Right, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 1999, at C.l 
(quoting Akhil K Amar, Yale University law professor). 
11 Garrett Epps, Playing Supreme Court with Privacy: 4th Circuit Went Too Far in Reno 
v. Condon, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 8, 1999, at 58; see also Vivian Berger, Don't Mourn 
Miranda Yet, NAT'L. LJ., Sept. 20, 1999, atA-22 (noting the Fourth Circuit is "the court 
of appeals most viscerally hostile to defendants' rights"); Carrie Johnson, Testing the 
Limits: 4th Circuit's Conservative Push to High Court, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 4, 1999, at 1; 
Brooke A Masters, 4th Circuit Is Steering Hard to the Right, WASH. POST, July 5, 2000, at 
B-1 (stating that the Dickerson decision was the 4th Circuit's biggest loss of the Supreme 
Court's term). 
12 See, e.g., Stephen]. Schulfofer, 'Miranda' Now on the Endangered Species List, NAT'L 
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the Fourth Circuit was animated by a desire to undo Miranda, critics 
deemed the decision "a heavy dose of conservative judicial activism"13 
and "the most surprising and ill-considered instance of ~udicial activ-
ism' in recent memory. "14 In reversing the Fourth Circuit, the Su-
preme Court too has been criticized for using Dickerson as a vehicle to 
advance its ideological preferences. By declaring that Congress can-
not overturn Court-created constitutional norms/5 the Court's reaf-
firmation of Miranda has been portrayed as part and parcel of a 
Rehnquist Court campaign to limit congressional power. For exam-
ple, commenting that "[t]here might well have been a period, some-
time in the last three decades, when the Court would have overturned 
Miranda," The New York Times's Linda Greenhouse argues that "timing" 
explained the Court's decision: the fact that "the [C]ourt's interest in 
protecting its constitutional turf against congressional incursions was 
at a peak unmatched in recent years."16 
In the pages that follow, I will take issue with this prevailing wis-
dom. Pointing to the judiciary's Article III duty to decide cases ac-
cording to the law, I will argue that the Fourth Circuit was correct in 
paying attention to Congress's mandate that the 1968 statute, not 
Miranda, set out the "law" governing the admissibility of confessions.17 
LJ., Mar. I, 1999, at A-22 (describing the Fourth Circuit's decision as "an extraordi-
nary act of judicial buccaneering"); Stuart Taylor, Jr., Raising Miranda: WiU the Supreme 
Court Remain Silent?, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 25, 1999, at 67 (describing how the Fourth Cir-
cuit overruled Miranda even though the Department of Justice had not questioned its 
applicability). 
l' 
- Taylor, supra note 12, at 67. 
14 Schulhofer, supra note 12, at A22. 
1
:; Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2329. 
1
'' Linda Greenhouse, A Turf Battle's Unlikely Vzctim, N.Y. TIMES, June 28, 2000, at 
A20; see also Tony Mauro, Split Branches: Little Deference to Congress as Court Curbs Federal 
Power, LEGAL TIMES, May 22, 2000, at 1 (quoting a speech by Justice Scalia, suggesting 
that the Supreme Court should no longer presume acts of Congress to be constitu-
tional because Congress takes the attitude that "'it will do anything it can get away with 
and let the Supreme Court worry about the Constitution"'). For other news analyses 
calling attention to the ongoing battle between the Court and Congress, see Linda 
Greenhouse, Supreme Court: The Justices Decide 'Who's in Charge, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 
1999, at 4-1 (noting the Court's lack of deference to Congress's federal legislation 
\iews); Suzanna Sherry, Some Targets Were Larger than Others, WASH. Posr,July 4, 1999, 
at B4 (indicating the Court's term was highlighted by invalidating federal legislation 
that \iolated state's rights). Ironically, had the Supreme Court ruled the other way in 
Dickerson, it-like the Fourth Circuit-would have been criticized for its opportunistic, 
ideological repudiation of Aliranda. 
17 This is not to say that the Fourth Circuit was correct in concluding that the 1968 
statute was constitutional. My point is simply that, if constitutional, the 1968 statute 
trumped Miranda. See infra notes 59-65 and accompanying text (explaining that judi-
cial powers are limited and that the courts must enforce applicable laws). 
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Otherwise, litigants could effectively direct courts to decide cases ac-
cording to their policy preferences, not the law. At the same time, the 
Clinton administration was not obligated to defend the constitutional-
ity of the 1968 statute. The executive's Article II power to interpret 
the Constitution certainly extends to the Clinton justice Department's 
decision to argue that the 1968 statute was unconstitutional but that 
Dickerson's confession was admissible under Miranda. Faced with a 
real dispute over the confession's admissibility but unable to direct the 
government to defend the 1968 statute, the Supreme Court was right 
in appointing counsel to defend the 1968 statute. 
None of this is to say that ideology did not animate either the 
Fourth Circuit or the Supreme Court.18 It is to say, however, that core 
separation of powers principles support the decisions both to consider 
the 1968 statute and to appoint outside counsel to defend the statute's 
constitutionality. In other words, while the line separating judicial ac-
tivism from judicial restraint may be murky, the responsibility for each 
branch of government to independently interpret the law is clear. 
I. PRELIMINARIES 
In our tripartite system of government, a system of checks and 
balances, each branch is empowered to independently interpret the 
Constitution and, in so doing, to serve as a bulwark against the ag-
grandizement of too much power in any other branch. Furthermore, 
each branch possesses core powers-powers that cannot be delegated 
to another branch. Consider the relationship of the judiciary to the 
executive. On the one hand, since the "judicial power of the United 
States" is vested in federal courts, 19 Congress could not transfer this 
power to executive agencies. "That would be to sap the judicial power 
as it exists under the Federal Constitution, and to establish a govern-
ment of a bureaucratic character alien to our system .... "20 At the 
18 See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying text (calling attention to claims that 
both the Fourth Circuit and the Supreme Court were politically motivated); see also Er-
win Chemerinsky, The Court Should Have Remained Silent: Why the Court Erred in Deciding 
United States v. Dickerson, 149 U. PA. L. REv. 287, 291 (suggesting that the Fourth 
Circuit was animated by ideology); infra note 102 (same). For a treatment of the role 
of ideology in judicial decisionmaking, see generally LEE EPSTEIN & JACK K..'ll'IGHT, THE 
CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE (1998) (providing an overview of ideological decisionmak-
ing). 
19 U.S. CONST. art III, § 1. 
2
° Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 57 (1932). Since Crowell was decided, of course, 
administrative agencies have assumed more and more judicial functions. Nevertheless, 
their orders are subject to review by an Article lii court. 
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same time, the judiciary must respect the executive's power to enforce 
the law. For example, the executive possesses prosecutorial discre-
tion: the power to launch prosecutions, introduce evidence, and the 
like. As such, it would be impermissible for a federal court to assume 
the role of prosecutor by, say, introducing into evidence a confession 
that the executive deemed inadmissible. 
'What then of the Dickerson litigation? Here, the executive intro-
duced into evidence a confession that it deemed admissible under 
Miranda, the standard it employs in assessing confessions.21 And while 
the criminal defendant, Charles Dickerson, thought the confession 
should be suppressed, Dickerson agreed with the government that 
Miranda was the governing rule of law.22 By applying a different rule 
of law than the one subscribed to by both the government and Dicker-
son, the appeals court put its desire to "say what the law is" ahead of 
the executive's desire to define criminal prosecutions. 
How can I say that this decision is grounded in the separation of 
powers, not a usurpation of prosecutorial discretion-a core executive 
power?23 More fundamentally, in the absence of a concrete dispute 
over the appropriate legal standard, how can I say that the separation 
of powers requires federal courts to sua sponte raise the 1968 statute? 
Let me begin with a confession. When I began thinking about 
this project, my first impulse was to write a paper condemning conser-
vatives for engaging in the same type of activism that conservatives 
have long accused liberal judges of, that is, reaching out to decide 
cases to make law, not resolve concrete adversarial disputes. Specifi-
cally, in campaigning against "judicial activism," Ronald Reagan and 
other conservatives bemoaned "a weakening of the court's resolve to 
~ 1 "On January 27, 1997, Charles T. Dickerson confessed to robbing a series of 
banks in Maryland and Virginia." United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 671 (4th 
Cir. 1999). According to the government, Dickerson \\'aS read (and waived) his 
Miranda rights. ld. at 675-76. 
~" According to Dickerson, the confession took place before the reading of his 
Miranda rights. I d. at 674-76. The United States District Court for the Eastern District 
of Virginia sided \\ith Dickerson and, consequently, suppressed the confession. See 
United States v. Dickerson, 971 F. Supp. 1023, 1023-25 (E.D. Va. 1997) (upholding its 
pre\ious decision to suppress certain e\idence that was gathered in violation of Dicker-
son's constitutional rights), rev'd, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999), rev'd, 120 S. Ct. 2326 
(2000). 
~" In Dickerson, an amicus brief filed by former Attorney General Benjamin Chiletti 
argues that, by raising the 1968 law sua sponte, the Fourth Circuit undermined core 
executive powers. Brief of Benjamin R. Chiletti, Amicus Curiae, Dickerson v. United 
States, 120 S. Ct. 578 (1999) (No. 99-5525). For reasons detailed below, I think this 
position is incorrect. See infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text. 
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abide by the case or controversy requirement."24 Indeed, Reagan's 
first Attorney General, William French Smith, "pledged on taking of-
fice ... that cases should not be adjudicated where the party bringing 
the case had only a remote connection with the issues; where the un-
derlying dispute was not 'ripe' ... and where the matter was properly 
resolved by the political branches, Congress or the executive."25 Ac-
cordingly, for Smith and other conservatives, the separation of powers 
demands that courts should only review those issues that are truly in 
controversy and therefore represented by vigorous advocacy. 26 
On the surface, the Miranda override litigation appears to be pre-
cisely the type of case that Smith had in mind. With no adversarial 
dispute on the governing substantive legal rule, the question of 
whether prosecutors should utilize the 1968 statute seemed a political 
matter best resolved by Congress and the executive, not the courts. 
To determine whether Congress had overruled Miranda, a court (or 
so I thought) would have to eschew this "dispute resolution" model in 
favor of the so-called "public values" model of adjudication.27 Under 
the public values model, "the function of the judge ... is not to resolve 
disputes, but to give the proper meaning to our public values."28 Con-
24 
WILLIAM FRENCH SMITH, LAW AND jUSTICE IN THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION 59 
(1991). 
25 SMITH, supra note 24, at 60. Under this view, when the basis for decision falls 
outside the framework of the litigants' arguments, "the adjudicative process has be-
come a sham, for the parties' participation in the decision has lost all meaning." Lon 
L. Fuller, TheFrmns and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353, 388 (1978). Relat-
edly, "[a]n adversary presentation seems the only effective means for combating the 
natural human tendency to judge too swiftly in terms of the familiar that which is not 
yet fully known." !d. at 383. 
26 For these conservatives, "the premise of our adversarial system" has always been 
that federal courts "do not sit as self-directed boards of legal inquiry and research, but 
essentially as arbiters of legal questions presented and argued by the parties before 
them." Lebron v. Nat'l RR Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 408 (1995) (O'Connor,]., 
dissenting) (quotation marks omitted). 
27 See generally Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizingjusticiability: The Example of Moot-
ness, 105 HARV. L. REv. 603, 625-28 (1992) (presenting these two models of adjudica-
tion). 
28 Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term: Fareward: The Farms of justice, 93 
HARv. L. REV. 1, 30 (1979). For proponents of this model, "the fundamental concep-
·tion of litigation as a mechanism for private dispute settlement is no longer viable. 
The argument is about whether or how a government policy or program shall be car-
ried out." Abram Chayes, The /Wle of the judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REv. 
1281, 1294-95 (1976). Correspondingly, justice comes not from individual participa-
tion, but from the process of giving meaning to constitutional values." Susan Bandes, 
The Idea of a Case, 42 STAN. L. REv. 227,287 (1990); see also Neal Kumar Katyal,judges as 
Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REv. 1709, 1822 (1998) (defending judicial advicegiving as a 
way to "aid our governments in the task of serving their master-the American peo-
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sequently, concrete adverseness, while perhaps necessary to com-
mence litigation, "becomes unimportant, whatever the stage of litiga-
tion, since the primary goal is to resolve the issue, not to settle a dis-
pute between parties."29 In Dickerson, the fact that the government and 
Dickerson disagreed over the admissibility of the confession was more 
than sufficient adversiveness to support judicial resolution of any and 
all related questions. 
At first blush, the Dickerson litigation seemed like a textbook ex-
ample of the profound difference between the "public values" and 
"dispute resolution" models. For this very reason, a project calling at-
tention to the willingness of conservatives, both judges and interest 
groups like the Washington Legal Foundation, to compromise their 
views on the judicial role in order to advance their policy preferences 
seemed worth doing. It would highlight the difficulty of placing 
something as abstract as a vision of the separation of powers ahead of 
something as concrete as desired policy outcomes.30 
The longer I researched and thought about this issue, however, 
the more I came to doubt my original impulse. More to the point, as I 
will now argue, the sua sponte raising of the 1968 statute and the ap-
pointment of amicus curiae to defend the statute's constitutionality is 
consistent with the "dispute resolution" model of litigation. At its 
core, the "dispute resolution" model calls upon courts to see Article 
III as a limited grant of jurisdictional authority.31 Consequently, in 
order to respect the primacy of elected government decisionmaking, 
federal courts must vigilantly police the boundaries of their Article III 
powers. Accordingly, starting with Marbury v. Madison, the federal 
pie"). 
:0::'-f ~ Bandes, supra note 28, at 290. For an argument that the Framers understood 
the main purpose of the judiciary in Article III "cases" to be the expounding of federal 
law, see Robert]. Pushaw Jr., Arlicle m's CasejCQntroversy DistinctiQil and the Dual Func-
tions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DA.\IE L. REV. 447 (1994). For a sampling of articles 
highlighting the Supreme Court's sometimes-willingness to embrace the public values 
model, see Bandes, supra note 28, at 283 n.386; Gene R Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Stand-
ing, 72 CAL. L. REV. 68 (1984); Girardeau A. Spann, PropositiQil 209, 47 DUKE LJ. 187 
(1997). 
""' Nelson Lund made a similar point in Lawyers and the Defense of the Presidency, 1995 
B.Y.U. L. REV. 17, an article which showcased the willingness of the Bush administra-
tion to sacrifice its conception of Article II power in order to advance short-term policy 
priorities. See also John 0. McGinnis, Impeachable Defenses, 95 POL 'y REv. 27 (1999) 
(calling attention to the willingness ofleft-leaning academics to embrace originalism-
an interpretive theory they disavow in their writings-in arguing that President Clinton 
should not be impeached). 
~1 Questions of jurisdiction "should be given priority-since if there is no jurisdic-
tion there is no autHority to sit in judgment of anything else." Vt. Agency of Natural 
Res. v. United States ex reL Stevens, 120 S. Ct. 1858, 1865 (2000). 
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courts have sua sponte raised jurisdictional issues.32 For example, if a 
litigant lacks standing to sue, it is the judiciary's responsibility to dis-
miss the case-that opposing counsel may not have called attention to 
the standing issue is irrelevant. 
In the typical case, the "dispute resolution" model would see the 
absence of adversariness as proof positive that the court is without ju-
risdiction. Dickerson, however, is far from typical. The Department of 
Justice and the criminal defendant disagreed about whether there was 
proof to support a criminal conviction. Far more significant (for my 
purposes), the two sides disagreed over the admissibility of Dicker-
son's confession.33 In short, it is clear that the courts had jurisdiction 
over Dickerson, including jurisdiction over the admissibility of the con-
fession. The question then becomes whether, in resolving this dis-
pute, the court's power necessarily includes the power to take into ac-
count the 1968 statute. In part, this is a question of jurisdiction, 
namely: before determining whether Dickerson's confession is admis-
sible under Miranda, is the question of the 1968 statute's applicability 
a jurisdictional prerequisite?$4 Alternatively, in exercising its Article 
III power to decide the confession's admissibility, may a federal court 
consider legal arguments that it deems relevant but are not raised by 
either party? 
II. ARTICLE Ill AND THE DU1YTO "SAY WHAT THE LAW Is" 
The very idea of an independent judiciary is grounded in the be-
lief that it is for the courts to "say what the law is. "35 During the 1780s, 
the founders thought it "necessary to guarantee the judges' inde-
pendence and integrity" in response to a growing mistrust of elected 
32 In the Marbury litigation, the litigants did not question the jurisdictional author-
ity of the Supreme Court. Madison did not appear before the Court, choosing instead 
to ignore the lawsuit. Marbury's counsel, Charles Lee, not surprisingly did not call into 
question the Supreme Court's power to issue a writ of mandamus. See Marbury v. 
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 146-53 (1803) (suggesting the parties failed to raise 
jurisdictional issues the Court raised on its own). 
33 See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (noting the parties' disagreement 
over whether Dickerson confessed before he was read his Miranda rights). 
34 See infra notes 72-78 and accompanying text (discussing the tension between 
§ 3501 and Miranda). 
35 Sometimes, of course, it is for the political branches to say what the law is. On 
political questions, like impeachment, the power to "say what the law is" resides in the 
political branches. Furthermore (and far more significantly), the political branches 
regularly interpret the Constitution. See infra notes 83-87 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the power of presidential review). 
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government, especially the legislatures.36 In The Federalist No. 78, Ham-
ilton likewise spoke of the need for the judiciary to remain "truly dis-
tinct from both the legislative and the executive, and, in so doing, for 
the courts to keep elected officials "within the limits assigned to their 
authority."37 Accordingly, the "interpretation of the laws is the proper 
and peculiar province of the courts. "38 
This belief in an independent judiciary is very much tied to the 
notion that the "rule of law" should triumph over the "rule of men."39 
By insisting that the political branches "act through general, public 
rules," the founders embraced "a higher or constitutional law that 
governs ordinary lawmaking, as well as politically independent courts 
of law to enforce this higher law against public officials."40 In this way, 
the founders saw independent courts testing the legality of govern-
ment decisionmaking as the best hope of maintaining the rule of law 
and, with it, protecting citizens against tyranny. 
Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's 1995 decision in 
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm Inc.41 Concluding that Congress cannot re-
quire federal courts to reopen final judgments, the Court invalidated 
amendments to the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 allowing for 
the reopening of lawsuits that had been dismissed on technical 
grounds, namely, the failure to file within the (then pertinent) statu-
tory timelines.42 Pointing to the Framers' "sense of a sharp necessity to 
separate the legislative from the judicial power,"43 the Court approv-
ingly cited language from The Federalist No. 81 that "[a] legislature 
without exceeding its province cannot reverse a determination once 
made, in a particular case; though it may prescribe a new rule for fu-
,,, GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBUC: 1776-1787, at 
456 (1969). 
:<
7 THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 523-25 (Alexander Hamilton) Uacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961). 
"' /d. at525. 
~'' See Ernest Weinrib, The Intelligibility of the Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW: 
IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 59, 62-63 (Alan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan eds., 1987) 
(distinguishing Plato's beliefin the "rule of men" from Aristotle's belief in the "rule of 
law"). 
"" Stephen Macedo, The Rule of Law, justice, and the Politics of Moderation, in THE 
RULE OF LAW 148, 149 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994). This is not to say, however, that courts 
ought to issue advisory opinions, comment on nongermane legal issues through dicta, 
and the like. It is to say, instead, that-when courts have jurisdiction to decide-the 
law, not the arguments of litigants, should control. 
41 514 u.s. 211 (1995). 
"' See id. at 24{) (holding the amendment unconstitutional "to the extent that it re-
quires federal courts to reopen final judgments entered before its enactment"). 
"~ /d. at 221. 
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ture cases."44 By separating the judicial power "not merely to rule on 
cases, but to decide them" from the legislative power to prescribe rules, 
Plaut makes clear that popular government cannot interfere with the 
court's power to interpret the laws.45 
Plaut, of course, is little more than a modern day application of 
Marbury v. Madison.46 Marbury, by declaring that "[i]t is emphatically 
the province and duty of the judicial department to [s]ay what the law 
is," speaks to the Court's power and obligation to decide cases in ac-
cordance with the governing law.47 And while Marbury is especially 
concerned with the constitutionality of elected government decision-
making, the question of whether or not government conforms to its 
legal obligations is certainly at the heart of the decision.48 Corre-
spondingly, in holding that courts can order government officials to 
comply with the law,49 Marbury makes clear that no one is above the 
law and, accordingly, that courts will not facilitate disobedience to the 
law.50 
Like The Federalist No. 78, Marbury equates judicial independence 
with the power to "say what the law is." As such, it is well established 
that parties to a dispute cannot agree to bind the court on stipulated 
questions of law. Otherwise, the rule of men would triumph over the 
rule of law. For this reason, "[w]hen an issue or claim is properly be-
fore the court, the court is not limited to the particular legal theories 
advanced by the parties, but rather retains the independent power to 
44 Id. at 222 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 545 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob 
E. Cooke ed., 1961)). 
45 Id. at 218-19. 
46 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
47 Id. at 177; see also James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, "Some Effectual Power": 
The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article m Courts, 98 COLU!If. L. 
REv. 696, 711-15 (1998) (discussing the development of the federal courts at the Con-
stitutional Convention). 
48 See DAVID P. CURRIE, FEDERAL JURISDICTION IN A NUTSHELL 5 (3d ed. 1990) (dis-
cussing nvo theories of judicial review in Marbury); Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional 
Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE LJ. 1363, 1370-71 (1973) (discussing the role 
of the courts in a system of limited government); Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the 
Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 11 (1983) (arguing that "an article Ill court 
cannot be 1urisdictionally' shut off from full consideration of the substantive constitu-
tional issues"). 
49 See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 180 (concluding that courts are bound by the 
Constitution). 
50 See Dean Alfange, Jr., Marbury v. Madison and Original Understandings of judicial 
Review: In Defense of Traditional Wisdom, 1993 SUP. Cr. REv. 329, 378-79 (discussing why 
Marbury stood for the concept that no person is above the law). 
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identify and apply the proper construction of governing law."51 Fur-
thermore, since "[t]he public interest that a result be reached which 
promotes a well-ordered society is foremost in every criminal proceed-
ing ... the proper administration of the criminal law cannot be left 
merely to the stipulation of parties. "52 
The duty of courts to look to the law, not just the arguments of 
litigants, implies that courts can, among other things, undertake in-
dependent research to sort out the relevant law, consider the argu-
ments of amici, and address issues necessary to the resolution of the 
case that neither party raises in briefs or oral arguments.53 For exam-
ple, in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 54 both parties to the case sought to 
preserve Swift v. Tyson,55 that is, the federal courts' then-existing prac-
tice of applying federal common law in diversity cases. Indeed, Erie's 
counsel, Theodore Kiendel, saw his primary goal as "preserv[ing] 
Swift," notwithstanding the fact that Erie would have won under state 
~ 1 Kamen v. Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc., 500 U.S. 90, 99 (1991); see also Teague v. 
Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 300 (1989) (plurality opinion) (acknowledging the Court's will-
ingness to consider an argument raised only in an amicus brief); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 
U.S. 643, 646 n.3 ( 1961) (same), overruled in part on other grounds by Stone v. Powell, 428 
U.S. 465 (1976); Estate of Stanford v. Comm'r, 308 U.S. 39, 51 (1939) ("We are not 
bound to accept, as controlling, stipulations as to questions of law."); Swift & Co. v. 
Hocking Calley Ry. Co., 243 U.S. 281,289 (1917) ("The duty of this court, as of every 
judicial tribunal, is limited to determining rights of persons or of property, which are 
actually controverted in the particular case before it. ... No stipulation of parties or 
counsel ... can enlarge the power, or affect the duty, of the court in this regard." 
(quotation marks omitted)). In citing these cases, I do not mean to suggest that courts 
possess a roving commission to decide any and all questions of law that they deem 
relevant to the underl}ing dispute. See infra notes 130-33. 
"~ Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 259 (1942). It is noteworthy that 
"[b]ecause personal liberty is most at stake, in the criminal law, the normative force of 
the rule of law is especially strong and undergirds the maxim 'No crime, no punish-
ment v.ithout law.'" Kenneth Henley, Rule of Law, in 2 PHILOSOPHY OF LAW: AN 
ENCYCLOPEDIA 765, 766 (Christopher B. Grayed., 1999). 
"-' It also suggests that, when fashioning equitable relief, federal courts may take 
account of the "public interest." United States Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall 
P'ship, 513 U.S. 18, 26 (1994). For example, in the context of deciding a motion to 
vacate a judgment (after the parties entered into a settlement agreement, mooting the 
merits of the case), the Supreme Court has ruled that: ":Judicial precedents are pre-
sumptiYely correct and valuable to the legal community as a whole. They are not 
merely the property of private litigants and should stand unless a court concludes that 
the public interest would be served by a vacatur.'" Id. (quoting Izumi Seimitsu Kogyo 
Kabushiki Kaisha v. United States Philips Corp., 510 U.S. 27,40 (1993) (Stevens,]., dis-
senting)). 
:.t 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (considering which state's law to apply in a federal diversity 
case). 
:.:. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 19 (1842) (holding that the Rules of Decision Act referred to 
statutes and local usages, not state common law), overruled by Erie R.R., 304 U.S. at 78. 
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law. 56 Arguing that "[t]he persistent criticisms of Swift ... have largely 
been misdirected," Kiendel sought to use Swift to his advantage.57 
Consequently, with Tompkins' attorneys firmly committed to Swift, the 
Justices understood that neither party would call for the overruling of 
Swift-even if the Court specifically requested briefing on the issue. 
Whether or not Erie's sua sponte overturning of Swift is a byproduct of 
this litigation strategy, Erie stands for the proposition that the Court 
will place adherence to the law ahead of the legal arguments made in 
court. 
Erie is important for another reason. In holding that the parties to 
a controversy do not control "the choice oflaw," the Court made clear 
that it-not the parties-would decide whether a legal argument is or 
is not waivable. In some (even most) instances, the law contemplates 
that the parties to a dispute can waive pertinent legal claims.58 Other 
times, however, the law does not allow for waiver. On those occasions, 
it is the court's responsibility to honor the law, not party preferences. 59 
Another example of this phenomenon is the "gatekeeping role" 
the courts have assumed in administering the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence.60 In sorting out whether to admit expert scientific testimony, 
for example, a judge "should ... be mindful" of all "applicable rules" 
of evidence.61 More to the point, whenever the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence mandate a particular course of action, it is the court's duty to 
adhere to the law and take that mandate into account.62 That is the 
lesson of Marbury. 
What then of Dickerson? On the one hand, where jurisdiction is 
clear and the legal issue squarely before the court, Marbury is une-
quivocal in its demand that the court must make its decision under 
56 EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITimON 100 
(2000). 
57 !d. at 100 (quotation marks omitted). 
58 Consider, for example, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. Under the Act, 
"[a] person" whose statutory rights have been violated "may assert that violation as a 
claim or defense in a judicial proceeding." 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-l (c) (1994) (emphasis 
supplied). Here, Congress clearly left it to the affected party to claim or waive her 
statutory rights, a fact that (before the Supreme Court struck the Act down) several 
lower courts picked up on in refusing to sua sponte raise the statute. 
59 On questions of facts, parties may stipulate to erroneous facts, including the 
facts of where a transaction took place (something which would affect the choice of 
law). Parties, however, may not stipulate to the wrong law. 
60 Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,597 (1993). 
61 Id. at 595. 
62 And if the mandate is unconstitutional, it is the court's responsibility to invali-
date the mandate and thereby adhere to the supreme law. 
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the governing law.63 At the same time, the law includes Article III and, 
as M.arbU1)' makes clear, Article III places real limits on the judicial 
power. For example, questions irrelevant to the parties in a dispute 
are presumptively outside the scope of judicial authority. Further-
more, matters committed to the discretion of another branch are out-
side the purview of judicial review.64 In the end, Marbury calls upon 
courts to honor the Framers' admonition that the judicial power 
(which includes the power to "say what the law is") is "limited to cases 
of a Judiciary nature. "65 
In applying these principles to Dickerson, the language of the 1968 
statute is critically important. If the law grants the executive discre-
tion to choose between Miranda and the 1968 standard, the executive 
is free to waive its rights under the 1968 statute. But if the law man-
dates that federal courts-in assessing the admissibility of confes-
sions-adhere to the 1968 standard, courts are duty bound to take 
that statutory standard into account. Othemrise, rather than "say what 
the law is," the court would effectively leave it to the parties to stipu-
late the governing legal standard.66 Aside from violating their Article 
III responsibilities, such an approach would undermine Congress's 
Article I power to respond to Supreme Court decisions through the 
enactment of positive law. And while prosecutorial discretion is a core 
component of the executive's Article II powers, this discretion is in no 
way undermined by an independent judiciary grounding its decisions 
in the law.m The prosecutor remains free to choose whom it will 
''' When there are alternative grounds upon which a court can rule, courts should 
generally avoid ruling on the constitutionality of an act of Congress. See Ashwander v. 
Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis,]., concurring) ("The Court 
v.ill not pass upon a constitutional question although properly presented by the rec-
ord, if there is also present some other ground upon which the case may be disposed 
of."). Ashwander, however, does not permit a court to knowingly apply the wrong legal 
standard in ruling on a case. Ashwander, moreover, does not allow a court to sub silen-
tio assume that an act of Congress is unconstitutional so that it can avoid ruling on the 
constitutionality of a statute. 
''"' See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 170 (1803) (noting the limits of 
the Court's jurisdiction). 
'"' 2 F ARRM'D, THE RECORDS OF TilE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (1911). 
••· For further discussion, see infra Part III (noting that under Article ll, the separa-
tion of powers also protects executive branch prerogative). 
''
7 The judicial]' is only supposed to apply the law, not make law in competition 
v.ith the legislature. Needless to say, Congress could empower prosecutors with the 
discretion to employ either the statutory standard or li'Iiranda. See infra Part III (dis-
cussing Congress's place within the tripartite system). But the decision is Congress's, 
not the parties. Prosecutorial discretion is about the choice of whom to prosecute and 
,,·hat e\idence to introduce, not the legal theories that the courts v.ill employ. Other-
wise, the executi,·e would stand above both Congress and the courts. In particular, 
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prosecute and to choose what evidence it will introduce at trial.68 
* * 
The 1968 statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3501, is a command to the courts, 
not to the executive branch. In other words, while the executive re-
tains discretion over the launching of prosecutions and the introduc-
tion of evidence at trial, the executive has no control over the admini-
stration of § 3501. Furthermore, § 3501 does not grant judges the 
discretion to heed or disregard Miranda. The statute, instead, speci-
fies that "[i]n any criminal prosecution brought by the United 
States ... a confession ... shall be admissible in evidence if it is volun-
tarily given" and " [ t] he trial judge in determining the issue of volun-
tariness shaU take into consideration all the circumstances surround-
ing the giving of the confession. "69 By making use of mandatory 
language, Congress deemed the prosecution's decision to employ or 
courts could not demand that the executive adhere to judicial precedent. See infra 
note 126 (questioning whether courts can ignore executive policies that the parties do 
not raise). Likewise, Congress could not restrain the executive through the enactment 
of positive law by, for example, mandating that certain legal arguments not be waived. 
This strikes me as a profound violation of both Congress's Article I lawmaking power 
and the court's power to "say what the law is." See infra note 80 (noting the ramifica-
tions of allowing the executive to dictate the legal arguments that a court will con-
sider). For this reason, I think that Erwin Chemerinsky has it backwards when he 
claims that it is for the Justice Department, not the courts, to determine whether or 
not to employ the 1968 statute. See Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 297 ("It thus vio-
lates separation of powers for a court to invoke § 3501 and consider a confession in 
circumstances in which the Justice Department chose not to use it."). 
Of course, the President, as I argue in the next section, is free to interpret the 
Constitution and reach the conclusion that§ 3501 is unconstitutional. See infra Part III 
(discussing the President's powers under Article II). Accordingly, notwithstanding 
what either the courts or Congress says, the President is free to treat Miranda as "law" 
vis-a-vis executive branch decisionmaking. See infra Part III (noting that the Clinton 
administration's decision to view Miranda as the governing legal standard was constitu-
tionally protected under Article II). What the President cannot do, however, is run 
roughshod over the constitutional prerogatives of both the Congress and the courts. 
For this very reason, I reject the claim that, in Dickerson, the courts should not have 
ruled on § 3501 but, instead, should have served as advicegivers-telling the political 
branches what the law is without issuing a binding precedent (so that the question of 
whether § 3501 has legal force, ultimately, is a political matter to be worked out be-
tween Congress and the President). See generally Katyal, supra note 28, at 1711 (discuss-
ing the Court's role as an advicegiver). 
68 Courts, under Marbury, cannot interfere with matters committed to the discre-
tion of another branch. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 170. At the same time, by introducing 
the confession into evidence, the executive empowers the court to apply the law gov-
erning the admissibility of confessions. For this reason, arguments made in Dickerson 
that the executive had waived the 1968 statute are incorrect. 
69 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (2000) (emphasis added). 
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waive the statute legally irrelevant. Consequently, to look to Miranda 
in assessing the admissibility of a confession, a court would have to ig-
nore a direct command from Congress to make use of the "totality of 
circumstances" test. In so doing, rather than abide by its Article III 
duty to "say what the law is," a court (aware of§ 3501) would have 
knowingly applied the wrong legal standard.70 
More is at stake here than the Article III duty to decide cases con-
sistent with the law. Honoring executive branch preferences, by using 
the Miranda standard, would make the judiciary an adjunct in the per-
formance of a purely executive function: the implementation of the 
law consistent with executive branch priorities.71 Specifically, if 
§ 3501, not Miranda, is law, the question of whether Miranda is satis-
fied is only relevant to those prosecutors who see Miranda as the ap-
propriate policy benchmark for the introduction of confessions. Con-
sequently, assuming that § 3501 was constitutional, a decision on 
whether Dickerson's confession satisfied Miranda would have been a 
decision about the implementation of Department of Justice policy 
preferences, not a decision grounded in the law. 
True, were a court to rule on Miranda, not§ 3501, the binding na-
ture of such a decision would ensure that the court is much more than 
7
" Contrary to the plain language of the statute, Erwin Chemerinsky argues that 
"Congress meant to leave the issue of § 3501 entirely in the hands of the executive 
branch." Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 307. Relying on a brief filed by the House 
Democratic Leadership, Chemerinsk)' argues that§ 3501 was "favored by those 'much 
more interested in election year symboli[sm]'" than in overruling Miranda. /d. (quot-
ing Brief of Amicus Curiae House Democratic Leadership at 5, Dickerson v. United 
States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000)). Contrary to this view, the Justice Department's exami-
nation of both the language and the history of § 3501 "confirms that Congress in-
tended Section 3501 to overrule ... Miranda." Brief for the United States at 18, 
United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999) (No. 99-5525); see also Brief of 
Amici Curiae Senators Orrin G. Hatch et al. at 5, United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 
667 (4th Cir. 1999) (No. 99-5525) (noting that§ 3501 supercedes Miranda). Further-
more, e\·en if election year politics was the driving force of§ 3501, the fact remains 
that the statutory text is an unambiguous command to federal court judges. See Brief 
of Amicus Curiae of the Bipartisan Legal Ad\isory Group of the United States House of 
Representatives at 22 n.25, United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(No. 99-5525) (noting that the politics involved in the passage of an act are not 
grounds for its elimination). 
71 Alternatively, by asking the court to rule on some standard other than the law, 
the executive branch is seeking to assume a core judicial function ("say[ing] what the 
law is"). Whatever characterization one likes, troublesome separation of powers issues 
are raised when one branch performs the functions of another. See Peter L. Strauss, 
Fonnal and Functional Approaches to Separation-ofPowm Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 
72 CORJI.'ELL L. REv. 488, 492-96 (1987) (suggesting that the separation of powers, 
more than anything, is a check against one branch aggrandizing power at the expense 
of another). 
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an underling of the executive.72 In contrast, were the executive able 
to override the court and introduce (under§ 3501) confessions found 
inadmissible under Miranda, the court would subordinate itself to the 
executive. In so doing, there would be a clear violation of one of the 
principal checks protecting judicial independence, namely the prohi-
bition against advisory opinions.7s At the same time, judicial resolu-
tion of the Miranda issue-notwithstanding its binding character-
comes perilously close to an advisory ruling. By sidestepping the 
governing law in favor of a ruling on an ancillary policy question, such 
a decision would speak only of matters unnecessary to the disposition 
of the case.74 And for the Supreme Court, the prohibition against advi-
72 For identical reasons, a Supreme Court decision upholding § 3501 would bind 
the executive. Specifically, when introducing a confession into evidence, the Justice 
Department could not circumvent "the law" governing the admissibility of confessions, 
that is, § 3501. For this reason, I think Erwin Chemerinsky is wrong in arguing that, in 
Dickerson, government attorneys could nullifY § 3501 simply by choosing "to proceed 
without the confession or ... [by] dismiss[ing] the prosecution against Dickerson." 
Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 305. Imagine, for example, that the government dis-
missed its prosecution. Rather than vitiate the Court's ruling, such a decision would 
call attention to the power of Dickerson-a decision so potent that it affects the gov-
ernment's choice about whom it will prosecute. None of this is to say that the Presi-
dent could not direct U.S. Attorneys to look to Miranda, not Dickerson, in sorting out 
whether a confession should be introduced into evidence. Furthermore, whenever a 
federal prosecutor introduced a confession into evidence, the prosecutor could call on 
the courts to apply Miranda. See infra Part III (discussing power of presidential review). 
Nevertheless, assuming that the Supreme Court had upheld § 3501, courts would ad-
here to§ 3501 and, in this way, bind the President. 
73 While there is significant disagreement over what constitutes an advisory opin-
ion, there is no question that a decision subject to review and modification by the po-
litical branches is a constitutionally prohibited advisory opinion. See Lee, supra note 
27, at 643-51. The classic Supreme Court statement on this issue is Haybum's Case, 2 
U.S. (2 Dall.) 408 (1792), where the Justices declined to issue nonbinding opinions on 
the amount of benefits owed to veterans of the Revolutionary War. 
74 Furthermore, if Miranda is a rule of constitutional law, then to decide the admis-
sibility question under Miranda (assuming § 3501 is constitutional) is in essence to 
render an unnecessary constitutional ruling. In so doing, the court would violate the 
prudential (but constitutionally informed) rule against rendering a constitutional de-
termination where a nonconstitutional ground for decision is available. See, e.g., Jean 
v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846, 854 (1985) ("Prior to reaching any constitutional questions, 
federal courts must consider nonconstitutional grounds for decision."); Alma Motor 
Co. v. Timken-DetroitAxle Co., 329 U.S. 129, 136 (1946) (declaring that courts should 
not consider the constitutionality of congressional action "unless such adjudication is 
unavoidable"). And although the Fourth Circuit in Dickerson seems to transgress the 
related prudential rule against premature acljudication of constitutional questions by 
not only raising § 3501 but determining its constitutionality-thus introducing, rather 
than avoiding, a constitutional question-this move was consistent with the also-related 
prudential rule favoring a disposition on the narrowest constitutional ground when a 
constitutional ground cannot be avoided. See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 
211, 217 (1995) (attempting to resolve the case by considering "the narrower ground 
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sory opinions (sometimes) stands as a bulwark against rulings on such 
questions of policy. 
One recent example of this phenomenon, United States National 
Bank of Oregon v. Independent Insurance Agents of America, Inc.,75 raised 
an issue quite similar to that presented in Dickerson. Specifically, in a 
lawsuit concerning the meaning of a statutory provision, neither party 
called into question the validity of the underlying statute. Although 
recognizing that the Court's decision would be binding on the parties, 
the Justices nonetheless held that a ruling grounded on something 
other than law would "permit litigants, by agreeing on the legal issue 
presented, to extract the opinion of a court on hypothetical acts of 
Congress or dubious constitutional principles, an opinion that would 
be difficult to characterize as anything but advisory."76 For this very 
reason, the Court suggested that-to avoid rendering an advisory 
opinion-it must first consider the continuing validity of the underly-
ing statute.77 Under this logic, before looking to Miranda to rule on 
for adjudication" of two possible constitutional challenges). Specifically, a Miranda-
based ruling would apply both to the states and the federal government, whereas a rul-
ing rounded in § 3501 would apply only to federal prosecutions. 
, 508 u.s. 439 (1993). 
7
" /d. at 447; see also Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 101 (1998) 
(holding that to resolve contested questions of law-even if binding on the parties-
when jurisdiction is in doubt "comes to the same thing as an advisory opinion, disap-
proved by this Court from the beginning"). On other occasions, however, the Court 
has signaled that it would not sua sponte consider antecedent legal issues. For exam-
ple, in validating (under the Federal Arbitration Act) a private arbitration agreement 
the Court refused to consider whether the Act even applied to employment contracts. 
Gilmerv. Interstate/johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991). While acknowledg-
ing that several amici discussed the applicability of the Act to employment contracts in 
their filings, the Court noted that the parties did not "raise the issue in the courts be-
low; it \\'as not addressed there; and it \\'as not among the questions presented in the 
petition for certiorari." ld. at 25 n.2. What the Court did not mention is that there was 
a near-unanimous consensus that the Act does apply to employment contracts. In 
other words, the Justices seem disinclined to sua sponte raise an issue that they do not 
consider relevant to the case's disposition. For further discussion, see supra note 51 
(listing cases where amici, rather than the parties to the case, raised legal issues and 
theories that proved determinative). See also infra notes 132-33 (suggesting that courts 
have a duty to raise antecedent legal issues). 
77 At the same time, the Court did not conclusively hold that it had a duty to rule 
on the validity of the underl}ing statute. In upholding a D.C. Circuit decision (which 
concluded that there was such a duty), the Supreme Court ruled that the appellate 
court "had discretion" to consider this issue. Therefore, the Justices saw no reason to 
decide whether the appellate court was correct in sa}ing that there was a duty to re-
solve this issue. See lndep. Ins. Agents, 508 U.S. at 447-48 (discussing the appellate 
court's discretion to consider the issue). The very next year, in Davis v. United States, 
the Justices refused to sua sponte raise§ 3501 in a ruling on the right to counsel. 512 
U.S. 452 (1994). While acknowledging that they have the authority to consider legal 
arguments that neither party raises, the Justices observed that "we are reluctant to do 
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the validity of a confession, a court-to avoid rendering an advisory 
opinion-would first want to look to § 3501. If it found § 3501 consti-
tutional, Miranda would be a legal nullity and consequently should 
not be the basis of decision. Alternatively, if § 3501 were unconstitu-
tional, Miranda would be the appropriate rule of decision. 
Whether or not one accepts Independent Insurance Agents's charac-
terization of what constitutes an advisory opinion,78 it is hard to square 
the grounding of a decision on a legal nullity with the Article III 
command to "say what the law is." Consider, for example, a ruling on 
the admissibility of a confession under Miranda, not § 3501. The 
precedential effect of such a decision would be quite suspect. After 
all, the Department of Justice could eschew the Miranda standard in 
favor of§ 3501 or, alternatively, make use of Miranda in some cases 
and § 3501 in other cases. 
To preserve its place in government, the judiciary must respect 
both the reaches and limits of Article III. Thus, by introducing Dick-
erson's confession into evidence, the executive opened a Pandora's 
box that it could not close. Specifically, notwithstanding the parties' 
failure to raise§ 3501, the court had jurisdiction to take into account 
the law governing the admissibility of confessions. That law (at least 
untiljune 26, 2000) included§ 3501. Consequently, whether or not 
the question of§ 350l's constitutionality can be cast as a jurisdictional 
one, a court's Article III responsibility to "say what the law is" strongly 
supports judicial resolution of the § 3501 issue. And while inherent 
limits on a court's ability to discover statutes and regulations (let alone 
legal arguments) suggest that courts are not under a duty to discover 
all relevant law, the mandatory nature of§ 3501 suggests that the sua 
sponte raising of the statute was proper, not simply permissible.79 
so when the issue is one of first impression involving the interpretation of a federal 
statute on which the Department of justice expressly declines to take a position." !d. at 
457 n.*. Taken together, these two rulings cast doubt on the Court's suggestion that-
to avoid rendering an advisory opinion-it must answer antecedent legal questions by, 
among other things, determining what legal standard governs the dispute. See also Eric 
D. Miller, Should Courts Consider 18 U.S. C. § 3501 Sua Sponte?, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 1029, 
1039 n.56 (1998) (contending that the Court in Davis may have thought that§ 3501 
"should be considered sua sponte at some point in the future"). 
78 I do not. Like Evan Lee, I would limit the ban on advisory opinions to judg-
ments subject to review by the political branches and to preenactment review, that is, 
judgments on laws that have not taken effect. See Lee, supra note 27, at 643-44 (de-
scribing the various meanings of "advisory opinion"). Moreover, for reasons described 
above, it is unclear whether the Court really subscribes to this standard. See supra note 
77 (discussing the fact that the Court suggests it has authority to render advisory opi-
nons but generally declines not to do so). 
79 See infra notes 132-33 (discussing "rule of law" constraints that limit the court's 
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Correspondingly, a Miranda-based ruling would eschew the longstand-
ing presumption that acts of Congress are constitutional and, in so do-
ing, frustrate Congress's Article I prerogative to amend the rules of 
decision in nonconstitutional cases.8° Consequently, until the ques-
tion of§ 3501's constitutionality was settled, the courts should have 
looked for ways not to ground their rulings on Miranda--even if that 
would have meant the dismissal of the lawsuit. 
The Fourth Circuit was correct in sua sponte raising the § 3501 is-
sue in Dickerson. Otherwise (since it thought § 3501 constitutional), it 
would have confronted a true no-win situation. Specifically, since the 
district court suppressed the confession on the basis that it violated 
Miranda,81 the Fourth Circuit thought it had a choice between (a) ap-
plying the correct legal standard and allowing the admission of a valid 
confession or (b) applying the wrong legal standard and keeping the 
confession out of evidence. In other words, aside from honoring its 
Article III responsibility to rule on the law, there were strong prag-
matic reasons supporting the decision.82 
power to sua sponte raise legal issues and explaining why those constraints do not ap-
ply to Dickerson). Furthermore, to honor both Article III and the rule of law, courts 
should decide cases according to (their understanding ot) the relevant law, including 
statutes and theories of interpretations uncovered by law clerks, amici, etc. See supra 
notes 35-57 an accompanying text (discussing the analysis courts should make in de-
termining "what the law is"); infra notes 121-33 and accompanying text (describing the 
need for courts to inform themselves using outside sources in order to determine the 
"law"). 
"" Congress, as the Supreme Court recognized in Dickerson, "retains the ultimate 
authority to modify or set aside any judicially created rules of evidence and procedure 
that are not required by the Constitution." 120 S. Ct. at 2332. Title Eighteen of the 
United States Code § 3501 was premised on the belief that the Constitution did not 
mandate the so-called Miranda warnings. See Paul G. Cassell, The Statute that Time For-
got: 18 U.S.C. §3501 and the Overhauling ofMiranda, 85 IOWA L. REv. 175, 227-31 
(1999) (arguing that "the Constitution simply does not require the Miranda rules," 
which are merely "recommended procedural safeguards"). Consequently, by allowing 
the executive to dictate the legal arguments that a court will consider, Congress's Arti-
cle I lawmaking powers would also be subordinated to executive branch desires. While 
Congress would remain free to use its other powers (appropriations, for example) to 
pressure the executive into defending the constitutionality of the 1968 statute, Con-
gress could not--consistent with the executive's Article II powers-mandate that the 
Justice Department defend the statute. See infra notes 89, 94-96 and accompanying text 
(describing how the President does not have to concede to all congressional de-
mands). For this very reason, Congress must also look to the courts to protect its law-
making prerogatives by saying "what the law is." 
"I See supra note 22. 
"~ In contrast, a court that thought§ 3501 unconstitutional, rather than strike the 
statute down and declare Aliranda the governing legal standard, might well prefer rul-
ing on iUiranda. Like\\ise, a court that thought the confession admissible under 
Miranda might prefer to rule on Miranda and thereby avoid ruling on the constitution-
ality of§ 3501. By calling attention to circumstances where a court might prefer to 
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Ill. ARTICLE II AND THE PRESIDENT'S POWER NOT TO 
EXECUTE UNCONSTITUTIONAL LAWS 
What then of the Article II prerogatives of the executive branch? 
Just as Article ill protects the courts from grounding their decisions 
on the legal theories subscribed to by the parties to a case, the separa-
tion of powers also protects executive branch prerogatives. In particu-
lar, by independently interpreting the Constitution, presidents need 
not adhere to "unconstitutional" acts of Congress or to Supreme 
Court decisions. While there are some limits to the exercise of this 
power of presidential review, there is no question about President 
Clinton's authority to conclude both that § 3501 was unconstitutional 
and that the Dickerson confession was admissible under Miranda. 
Before turning to the ramifications of presidential review on the 
Dickerson litigation, a few words on why Article II empowers a Presi-
dent to disavow judicial and legislative interpretations of the Constitu-
tion.83 First and foremost, by presupposing that a President will check 
judicial and legislative excess, our tripartite system assumes that the 
executive is independent from, not subordinate to, Congress and the 
courts. To maintain that independence, a President must be able to 
decide for herself what the Constitution means. 84 The constitutional 
sidestep a ruling on § 3501 's constitutionality, I do not mean to suggest that it is ever 
appropriate for a federal court to knowingly apply the wrong legal standard. For a 
general treatment of the circumstances under which courts should avoid ruling on the 
constitutionality of federal legislation, see Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding Constitutional 
Qp,estions, 35 B.C. L. REv. 1003 (1994). 
83 The best known treatments of this subject are Presidential Authority to Decline 
to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. Off. Legal Counsel199 (1994); Frank H. 
Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 905 (1990); Michael Stokes 
Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. LJ. 
217 (1994). While the scholarly literature overwhelmingly supports the power of 
presidential review, there are some important critics of this position. See, e.g., RAOUL 
BERGER, ExECUTIVE PRMLEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MITH 306 (1974) (indicating that 
presidents are bound to "faithfully execute" all laws, even laws they think unconstitu-
tional); EDWARDS. CORWIN, THE PREsiDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787-1948, at 79 (3d 
ed. 1948) (same); ArthurS. Miller, The President and the Faithful Execution of the Laws, 40 
VAND. L. REv. 389, 396 (1987) (same). 
84 This is true even if the current or prior administration had earlier decided to 
abide by a judicial ruling or legislative finding. See Jeremy A. Rabkin & Neal E. Devins, 
Averting Government by Consent Decree: Constitutional Limits on the Enfarcement of Settlements 
with the Federal Government, 40 STAN. L. REv. 203, 219-26 (1987) (defending the power 
of one administration not to be bound by the policy preferences of another admini-
stration-even if those preferences are grounded in an understanding of the Constitu-
tion). For this reason, it is irrelevant whether past administrations (or even the 
Clinton administration) signaled their belief that 18 U.S.C. § 3501 was constitutional. 
See Cassell, supra note 80, at 197-225 (highlighting the fact that, prior to arguing in 
Dickerson that § 3501 is unconstitutional, every administration, including the Clinton 
HeinOnline -- 149 U. Pa. L. Rev.  271 2000-2001
2000] ASKING THE RIGHT QUESTIONS 271 
text, in significant respects, supports this understanding. By taking an 
oath to "faithfully execute the Office of the President ... [and to] 
preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution,"85 a President cannot 
knowingly act in violation of the Constitution as supreme law.86 For 
this reason, as recognized both in the Federalist Papers and in the de-
bates over the Constitution's ratification, presidential review extends 
beyond the power to veto legislation on constitutional grounds and to 
a President's "refus[al] to carry into effect an act that, [in his opin-
ion,] violates the Constitution."87 
The power of presidential review, moreover, is amply supported 
by historical practice. Starting with Thomas Jefferson's decision to 
pardon "every person under punishment or prosecution under" the 
Alien and Sedition Acts (which criminalized speech critical of the 
government), presidents-by independently interpreting the Consti-
tution-have departed from the constitutional judgments of Congress 
and the courts.&! The courts also acknowledge presidential review. By 
appointing counsel to defend legislation that a President is unwilling 
to defend (rather than hold the President in contempt for failing to 
defend the constitutionality of Congress's handiwork), the Supreme 
Court recognizes that "the means [available to a President] to resist 
administration, had spoken of its ·willingness to defend § 3501 "in an appropriate 
case"); see also infra note 97 (noting the critiques by the Bipartisan Legal Advisory 
Group of the United States House of Representatives and Cassell regarding the De-
partment of Justice's chosen legal position). Indeed, "[t]o argue othexwise is ulti-
mately to adopt a theory that says that the basis of law-including a declaration of un-
constitutionality-is the court's decision itself." Issues Raised by Foreign Relations 
Authorization Bill, 14 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 37, 51 (1990) (quoting Professor 
Sanford Le\inson). 
xs U.S. CONST. art. II,§ 1, cl. 8. 
"'; Writing in THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 524 (Alexander Hamilton) Uacob E. 
Cooke ed., 1961), Alexander Hamilton observed that "(n]o legislative act ... contrary 
to the Constitution, can be valid. To deny this would be to affirm that the deputy is 
greater than his principal; that the servant is above the master; [and] that the repre-
sentatives of the people are superior to the people themselves." Likewise, in an 1868 
letter to Gerrit Smith, Chief Justice Salmon Chase asked rhetorically: "How can the 
President fulfill his oath to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution, if he has no 
right to defend it against an act of Congress sincerely believed by him to have been 
passed in \iolation of it?" Issues Raised by Prmisions Directing Issuance of Official or 
Diplomatic Passports, 16 Op. Off. Legal Counsel. 18, 33 (1992) (quoting Chief Justice 
Chase's letter). 
'
7 James Wilson, Statement at the Pennsylvania Convention, 1787, in 2 THE 
DOCUML-....'TARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 450 (Merrill Jen-
sen ed., 1976). For a detailed analysis of the Framers' intent, see Paulsen, supra note 
83, at 228-62. 
'" See Neal De\ins & Louis Fisher,]udicialExclusivity andPoliticallnstability, 84 VA. L. 
REv. 83, 88-89 (1998) (recounting some notable examples of presidential re\iew). 
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legislative encroachment[s]" includes the power "even to disregard 
[laws]" that a President deems "unconstitutional."89 Presidential re-
view, finally, is conceded by Congress. Recognizing that it cannot "en-
trust the defense of its vital constitutional powers to the advocate[s] 
for the executive branch,"90 Congress has enacted legislation requiring 
the Attorney General to inform it of cases in which the Justice De-
partment will not defend the constitutionality of a federal statute.91 
In saying that a President need not execute laws that he deems 
unconstitutional, I do not mean to suggest that there are no constitu-
tional or prudential limits to the exercise of this power. A president, 
for example, cannot refuse to carry out a judicial order, even if he 
thinks the order is premised on an incorrect interpretation of the 
Constitution. That type of nonacquiescence would place a President 
above the Court, render the judicial power a nullity, and ultimately, 
cast doubt upon the very foundation of democratic government, 
namely: the rule oflaw.92 Out of respect for both Congress's lawmak-
89 Freytag v. Comm'r, 501 U.S. 868,906 (1991) (Scalia,]. concurring). In addition 
to Dickerson, the executive has challenged the constitutionality of, among other things, 
the Federal Election Campaign Act, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1976), the legis-
lative veto, INS. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 925 (1983), the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings 
Act, Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 719 n.1 (1986), the Ethics in Government Act, 
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 668 (1988), the Sentencing Reform Act, Mistretta v. 
United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989), and diversity preferences in broadcasting, Metro 
Broadcasting v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 551 (1990), uverruled l7y Adarand Constructors, Inc. 
v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995). In none of the cases did any member of the Coun ques-
tion the President's power to challenge the constitutionality of an act of Congress. 
90 S. REP. No. 95-170, at 11 (1977). 
91 Department of justice Appropriation Authorization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
132, § 21(a) (2), 93 Stat. 1049-50 (1979). Pursuant to this provision, Attorney General 
Janet Reno, on November 1, 1999, notified the speaker of the House that§ 3501 "can-
not constitutionally authorize the admission of statements that would be excluded un-
der the Supreme Court's holding in Miranda v. Arizona." Brief of Amicus Curiae of the 
Bipanisan Legal Advisory Group of the United States House of Representatives at 1, 
Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) (No. 99-5525). 
92 In subsequent cases, however, the executive branch "may stick to its (legal) guns, 
asserting in tomorrow's case theories that were rejected in yesterday's." Easterbrook, 
supra note 83, at 926. This is the view expressed by Abraham Lincoln in the matter of 
Dred Scott, that is, that the Supreme Coun's decision was binding on the parties to the 
case but on no one else. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address-Final Text (Mar. 
4, 1861), in THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 262, 268 (Roy P. Basler ed., 
1953); see al5o John 0. McGinnis, Mode£5 of the opinion Function of the Attorney General: A 
Nonnative, Descriptive, and Historical Prolegomerwn, 15 CARDozo L. REv. 375, 389-94 
(1993) (describing the "Independent Authority Model" in which the executive branch 
bears the burden of interpreting the Constitution "independendy in carrying out its 
responsibilities"). As applied to Dickerson, a decision upholding§ 3501 would not bind 
the executive to apply§ 3501 in future cases. Rather, the executive could continue to 
use Miranda in sorting out whether to introduce a confession into evidence. And even 
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ing prerogatives and the judicial power to interpret the Constitution, 
moreover, the executive may defend a statute that it thinks unconsti-
tutional.93 Office of Legal Counsel opinions allow for a President, as a 
matter of prudence, to defend constitutionally suspect legislation. 
According to these opinions: "The President should presume that 
enactments are constitutional" and should "execute the statute, not-
withstanding his own beliefs about the constitutional issue" if he 
thinks the Supreme Court would sustain the statute.94 Indeed, even 
"[w]here the President's independent constitutional judgment and 
his determination of the Court's probable decision converge on a 
conclusion of unconstitutionality," the President may nonetheless de-
fend the statute in order "to afford the Supreme Court an opportunity 
to review the constitutional judgment of the legislative branch."9s Fi-
nally, as a matter of pure politics, the President may cast aside his con-
stitutional objections and enforce a statute rather than risk funding 
cuts, endless oversight hearings, and other forms of congressional op-
probrium.96 
In the Dickerson case, these principles support the Clinton admini-
stration's decision to view Miranda, not§ 3501, as the governing legal 
standard. By independently interpreting the Constitution, the ad-
ministration concluded that § 3501 was unconstitutional and, conse-
quently, should be treated as a legal nullity. While the courts or Con-
gress might disagree with this assessment, the President's decision was 
if the courts were to apply§ 3501, not Miranda, the executive would not have to speak 
of§ 3501 in court. 
'" I disapprove of this practice. For me, the President's duty to "faithfully execute" 
the law should stand as a roadblock to the defense of a statute that the President 
deems unconstitutional. 
"i Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional Statutes, 18 Op. 
Off. Legal Counsel199, 200 (1994). 
'>:• 18 Op. Off. Legal Counsel, at 200.01. Along the same lines, Attorney General 
Benjamin Chiletti wrote in 1980 that "I do not believe that the prerogative of the Ex-
ecutive is to exercise free and independent judgment on constitutional questions pre-
sented by Acts of Congress. At the same time, I think that in rare cases the Executive's 
duty to the constitutional system may require that a statute be challenged .... " The 
Attorney General's Duty to Defend and Enforce Constitutionally Objectionable Legis-
lation, 4A Op. Off. Legal Counsel 55,59 (1980). 
'"' Mike Paulsen puts it this way: "In a bare-knuckled brawl, Congress can reduce 
the President to little more than a bureaucrat drawing a fixed salary, vetoing bills, 
granting pardons, and receiving foreign ambassadors-but without funds for hosting a 
state dinner (or even taking the ambassador to McDonald's)." Paulsen, supra note 83, 
at 322. Furthermore, as a condition of broad delegations of lawmaking power, presi-
dents may agree to arguably unconstitutional limitations on their Article II preroga-
tives. See Louis Fisher, The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives, 56 LAw & CONTE~IP. 
PROBS. 273 (Autumn 1993) (citing numerous examples of presidents agreeing to legis-
lati\'e vetoes as a condition on delegated authority). 
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a constitutionally protected exercise of his Article II powers. Corre-
spondingly, it is simply beside the point that the President's decision 
might run contrary to language in opinions from the Office of Legal 
Counsel, calling attention to reasons why a President may want to de-
fend a law that he thinks is unconstitutional.97 That policy is simply a 
prudential guideline; it cannot constrain the President's exercise of 
core Article II powers.98 
To say that the Justice Department was under no obligation to 
raise§ 3501, however, does not tell us how a court should respond to 
that decision. As an Article III matter, courts were under a duty to 
take § 3501, "the statute governing the admissibility of confessions in 
federal prosecutions," into account.99 What, then, is a court to do? 
On the one hand, it should have heard arguments both supporting 
and opposing the constitutionality of§ 3501. By "'sharpen[ing] the 
presentation of issues,"' concrete adversariness improves judicial deci-
sion-making by helping to ensure the presentation of a full spectrum 
of theories, both factual and legal.100 On the other hand, a court 
could not compel the President to defend the statute. Nor could it 
dismiss the case for want of adversariness. The executive and the 
criminal defendant were true adversaries; one side claimed the con-
fession admissible, the other disagreed. Consequently, not only would 
dismissing the lawsuit due to lack of adversariness have been wrong 
for Article III reasons, it would have undermined the President's Arti-
97 In an amicus brief filed by the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United 
States House of Representatives, the Department of Justice was taken to task for deviat-
ing from Office of Legal Counsel policy. Noting that the appellate court upheld the 
statute's constitutionality, the brief argued that there was ample reason to think§ 3501 
constitutional and, consequently, the Department's refusal to defend was "extraordi-
nary." Brief of Amicus Curiae of the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the United 
States House of Representatives at 3, Dickerson v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2326 (2000) 
(No. 99-5525). Likewise, Court-appointed amicus Paul Cassell criticized the Depart-
ment for failing to defend§ 3501. Cassell, supra note 80, at 223-25. 
98 Even if the policy were grounded in the President's understanding of the separa-
tion of powers, Article II protects the President's power to rethink his views on consti-
tutional questions. See generally Rabkin & Devins, supra note 84 (discussing constitu-
tional limits on the Court's ability to interfere with or control executive action). 
99 United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350, 351 (1994); see also supra notes 
51-53 and accompanying text (arguing that courts have a duty to look to the law, not 
solei~ the arguments advanced by the parties in a controversy). 
1 O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 494 (1974) (citation omitted); see also ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL jURISDICTION 40 (1st ed. 1989) ("Because federal courts have 
limited ability to conduct independent investigations, they must depend on the parties 
to fully present all relevant information to them. It is thought that adverse parties, 
with a stake in the outcome of the litigation, will perform this task best."). 
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de II power to independently interpret the Constitution.101 Specifi-
cally, by dismissing the lawsuit, a court would effectively tell the Presi-
dent that all confessions would be kept out of evidence unless and un-
til the President stood ready to defend the applicability of§ 3501. 
\\'hat then is a court to do? It must allow the case to go forward 
but it cannot compel either party to defend the statute's constitution-
ality. In the case of the Fourth Circuit (which had no choice but to 
resolve the dispute over the confession's admissibility), the options, 
ultimately, were either to determine § 3501 's constitutionality without 
the benefit of arguments defending the statute or, alternatively, to ap-
point counsel to defend the statute. It chose to appoint counsel and 
that choice seems reasonable.102 
Iol It is wrong, therefore, to analogize Dickerson to lawmaker challenges to either 
presidential claims of executive prhilege or to a president's war-making and foreign 
policy powers. In most of those cases, the federal courts have made use of any of a 
number of the "passive \irtues" to avoid rendering a decision on the merits. For ex-
ample, in tossing out Senator Bany Goldwater's claim that President Jimmy Carter 
could not unilaterally rescind a treaty \\ith Taiwan, a plurality of the Court concluded 
that the matter was a "dispute between two coequal branches of our Government, each 
of which has resources available to protect and assert its interests." Goldwater v. Car-
ter, 444 U.S. 996, 1004 (1979) (Rehnquist,J., concurring). Goldwater suggests that the 
Coun \\ill steer clear of Congress-White House disputes unless and until it has to, that 
is, unless and until the lawsuit becomes Congress's beef, not the beef of a handful of 
Congressmen. But unlike Goldwater (where it could leave the matter in the hands of 
the political branches), the Court could not steer clear of Dickerson. The President, 
after all, was entitled to argue that the confession should be introduced into e\idence. 
And once the issue of the confession's admissibility was before it, Article III demands 
that the Court decide the case according to the law. 
1"~ What is unreasonable, however, is the Fourth Circuit's apparent lack of interest 
in hearing arguments challenging the constitutionality of§ 3501. True, as the Dicker-
son majority points out, the Clinton Justice Department was unwilling to reveal its \iews 
on this question. At oral argument, counsel for the Justice Department refused to an-
swer questions about§ 3501, explaining that "he had been prohibited by his superiors 
at the Department of Justice from discussing§ 3501." United States v. Dickerson, 166 
F.3d 667, 681 n.14 (4th Cir. 1999); see also Cassell, supra note 80, at 203-23 (highlight-
ing efforts of the Clinton Justice Department to prevent judicial consideration of 
§ 3501). At the same time, the appellate court never asked the parties to brief the 
§ 3501 issue. According to Dickerson's counsel, james Hundley: "The basis for their 
decision was never identified as an issue on appeal. We didn't brief this issue at all." 
Carrie Johnson, A Lonely Crusade: Long Running Assault on Miranda Pays Off, LEGAL 
TIMES, Feb: 15, 1999, at 8. In particular, the order granting the Washington Legal 
Foundation time to participate in oral arguments came after briefs had been filed in 
the case. Moreover, although the parties knew full well that the Washington Legal 
Foundation would raise the§ 3501 issue, the appellate court's order made no mention 
of§ 3501. 
Unlike the Fourth Circuit, the D.C. Circuit, in Independent Insurance Agents, specifi-
cally requested the parties address-both in oral arguments and supplement briefs-
the continuing ''alidity of the underlying statute. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 6 
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The Supreme Court had a somewhat different choice. After all, 
by denying certiorari, it could have simply sidestepped Dickerson. 
However, the Justices had good reason to hear the case.103 The issue 
was important and squarely presented. The Justices, moreover, 
thought the Fourth Circuit was wrong in upholding the statute.104 
Consequently, a decision denying certiorari would (at least in the 
Fourth Circuit) allow into evidence confessions that ought to have 
been suppressed. By hearing the case, moreover, the Justices could 
accomplish important institutional objectives. Specifically, by con-
cluding that Congress could not overturn Miranda, the Court could 
speak of the binding nature of their constitutional decisions on other 
parts of the government.105 In this way, Dickerson allowed the Justices 
to protect their turf and, in so doing, facilitate the Rehnquist Court's 
efforts to expand the authority of the Court vis-a-vis Congress.106 
While the Justices may have preferred a truly adversarial controversy 
over the constitutionality of§ 3501,107 the very real adversariness be-
n.7, United States Nat'l Bank of Or. v. Indep. Ins. Agents of America, Inc., 508 U.S. 439 
(1993) (No. 92-484). In other words, the D.C. Circuit thought it important to ask for 
briefing and oral arguments on the question that it raised sua sponte. For this reason, 
there is force to the complaint that the Fourth Circuit was one-sided in its considera-
tion of§ 3501-upholding the statute "without the benefit of briefing in opposition." 
Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 695 (Michael,]., dissenting in part and concurring in part). In 
light of other cases where the Fourth Circuit signaled its interest in resolving the 
§ 3501 issue, there is ample reason to believe that a desire to undo Miranda explains 
the appellate court's sua sponte raising of§ 3501. See Cassell, supra note 80, at 209-16 
(describing Fourth Circuit campaign to consider§ 3501); see also supra text accompany-
ing notes 3-9 (identifying criticisiUS of the Fourth Circuit). 
103 For a valuable treatment on the steps the Supreme Court takes in deciding 
whether to grant certiorari, see H.W. PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE 216-70 (1991). 
104 Even if the Justices did not think about the merits of Dickerson, there were sev-
eral other reasons supporting a grant of certiorari. First, the Justice Department sup-
ported the petition. Second, because the President claimed that the statute was un-
constitutional, there was an apparent conflict between the political branches. Third, 
because other circuits did not sua sponte raise § 3501, there was a conflict of sorts be-
tween the Fourth Circuit and other appellate courts. 
105 Dickerson, 120 S. Ct. at 2328 ("While Congress has ultimate authority to modify 
or set aside any such rules that are not constitutionally required, it may not supersede 
this Court's decisions interpreting and applying the Constitution." (citations omit-
ted)). 
106 See Greenhouse, supra note 16 (stating that the Court might have overturned 
the bitterly fought five to four Miranda decision had it not been for its recent, notably 
stron~, desire to protect its constitutional turf against incursions by Congress). 
10 At the same time, there was real advantage in deciding the constitutionality of 
§ 3501 in a nonadversarial setting. With the Justice Department, as well as the Demo-
cratic leadership of the House, arguing that the statute was unconstitutional, the 
Court's decision does not appear especially countermajoritarian. See Mark A. Graber, 
The Nonmajoritarian Diffzculty: Legislative Deference to the judiciary, 7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 
35 (1993) (calling attention to ways in which the political branches encourage the 
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tween the Clinton Justice Department and the criminal defendant 
over the admissibility of the confession was more than enough to sup-
port a grant of certiorari in Dickerson.108 
In saying that the Court did the right thing in Dickerson, I do not 
mean to suggest that courts ought to search out ways to decide cases 
in which the executive is unwilling to defend the constitutionality of 
an act of Congress.109 Dickerson is a truly unusual case, involving the 
confluence of Congress's Article I power to enact rules of procedure 
in criminal cases, the courts' Article III duty to take those rules into 
account, a President's Article II power to repudiate those rules, and 
the presence of a truly adversarial dispute. In other words, the ap-
pointment of an amicus in Dickerson is totally consistent with-even 
mandated by-the "dispute resolution" model oflitigation. 
Contrast these facts to INS v. Chadha.110 In Chadha, the Depart-
ment of Justice refused to defend the constitutionality of the legisla-
tive veto, preferring, instead, to argue that the veto undermined the 
President's power to execute the law.m Specifically, the Department 
thought that a decision by the Attorney General to suspend a deporta-
tion was unreviewable by Congress (absent the enactment of legisla-
tion which satisfied the Constitution's demands of bicameralism and 
presentment). Rather than treat the legislative veto as a nullity (by re-
fusing to deport Chadha), however, the Department argued that it was 
willing to enforce a court ruling upholding the veto. For this reason, 
the Department argued that the court should settle this "dispute" 
notwithstanding the case's apparent lack of adversariness. Agreeing 
with this rationale, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals assured an "ad-
versary presentation of the issues" by allowing the House of Represen-
tatives and Senate to intervene in Chadha (but only after hearing oral 
Court to strike laws down). 
1
"" Furthermore, considering the number of years it took for a lower court to sua 
sponte raise§ 3501 (and with little reason to think-after thirty years of not invoking 
§ 3501-that the justice Department would make use of the statute), there was reason 
to doubt the prospect of a truly adversarial controversy over the applicability of§ 350 I. 
1
"' Courts can accomplish this feat either by appointing amici to defend the statute 
(as they did in Dickerson) or by broadening the rules of intervention to parties who 
othernise do not have standing. 
11
" 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
111 See Brief for the Immigration and Naturalization Service at 15-64, INS v. 
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (Nos. 80-1832, 80-2170, & 80-2171) (arguing that a legis-
lath'e veto would allow Congress to pass general legislation authorizing one or both of 
its houses to veto any decision or order of the President or other officer of the United 
States); see also BARBARA HINKSON CRAIG, CHADHA: THE STORY OF AN EPIC 
CONSTilUTIONALSTRUGGLE 148-87 (1990 ed.) (discussing Department of justice deci-
sionmaking in Chadha litigation). 
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arguments in the case!).112 The Supreme Court went along with the 
Justice Department's campaign for a definitive judicial resolution of 
the legislative veto's constitutionality.113 But, it should not have. Un-
like Dickerson, a decision dismissing the case would not have interfered 
with the President's Article II powers to both interpret the Constitu-
tion and "faithfully execute the laws." The only thing preventing the 
Attorney General from suspending Chadha's deportation was his 
hope that the Supreme Court would rule on the constitutionality of 
the legislative veto. Correspondingly, as an Article III matter, the 
Chadha litigation was an abomination. 114 The desire for a court deci-
sion, in and of itself, does not support judicial resolution of a case in 
which there is no disagreement. 
The lesson here is simple. A President's power to interpret the 
Constitution is not the power to demand judicial rulings on these in-
terpretations.115 Sometimes a President and Congress need to do bat-
112 See Jurisdictional Statement at 13 n.9, INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (No. 
80-1832) (explaining why Chadha satisfies the case or controversy requirement). Ironi-
cally, in filing a motion to intervene in Chadha, the House and Senate sought a rehear-
ing en bane with the express purpose of "argu[ing] that the Ninth Panel that had 
heard the case had erred in granting jurisdiction because there had been no adverse-
ness." CRAIG, supra note 111, at 166; see Brief of the United States House of Represen-
tatives at 41-50, INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (Nos. 80-1832, 80-2170, & 80-2171) 
(arguing that the Court was without jurisdiction to decide Chadha). 
113 The Justice Department saw Chadha as the perfect vehicle to challenge the legis-
lative veto. By finding that Chadha did not meet the statutory requirements of "hard-
ship," the legislative veto became a clear intrusion into the executive's power to im-
plement the law. See CRAIG, supra note 111, at 167 (proposing that in Chadha the 
Justice Department was seeking the Court's "stamp of approval"). For this reason, 
Chadha, not Dickerson, may be the emblematic case of conservatives willing to suspend 
their campaign against judicial activism in order to advance their ideological agenda in 
court. 
114 My complaint here is that the courts created a case or controversy by allowing 
de facto legislative standing without the usual requisites. Indeed, there was good rea-
son to think that Chadha was moot. By marrying an American citizen, Chadha was enti-
tled to stay in the United States. See8 U.S.C. § 1430(b) (1994) ("Any person ... whose 
spouse is ... a citizen of the United States ... may be naturalized upon compliance 
with all the requirements of the naturalization laws .... "). Of course, it may be that 
the Justices reached out to decide Chadha because they were eager to strike down the 
legislative veto. But this desire to expound on the Constitution's meaning should give 
way to the jurisdictional demands of Article 111. See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. 
United States ex reL Stevens, 120 S. Ct. 1858, 1862 (2000); see also infra note 116 (argu-
ing that the Court wrongfully appointed amicus in the Bob Jones case in order to fur-
ther certain political goals). 
115 See Michael Stokes Paulson, Nixon Now: The Courts and the Presidency After 
Twenty-Five Years, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1337, 1363-66 (1999) (highlighting the absurdity of 
Nixon, who on the one hand claimed absolute immunity from compulsory judicial 
process, while on the other hand came to the courts, hat in hand, asking for the courts 
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tle with each other over the Constitution's meaning.116 In Chadha, the 
President's squabble was with Congress. While seeking cover behind a 
court ruling may have made political sense to the President,117 he 
should have taken his complaint to the Congress.118 Sometimes, how-
ever, courts should intercede in what appears to be a dispute between 
the political branches. In Dickerson, the presence of a dearly adversar-
ial dispute necessitated the appointment of an amicus to defend 
§ 3501. Otherwise, the President's Article II power to independently 
interpret the Constitution would have been jeopardized. In the end, 
fidelity to the separation of powers-not a desire to enhance the judi-
ciary's power to expound on public values-may well explain the 
Court's action in Dickerson.119 
IV. THE RULE OF LAW AND DICKERSON 
In the preceding pages, I have argued that the judiciary's Article 
III responsibility to "say what the law is" and the President's Article II 
to sar that this is so). 
1 
'· For this very reason, the Court was wrong to appoint amicus to argue the "gov-
ernment's side" in Bob jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599 n.24 (1983). In 
Bob Jones, both parties agreed that the University was entitled to tax-exempt status, not-
withstanding its religiously based policies against interracial dating and marriage by 
students. See generally Thomas McCoy & Neal Devins, Standing and Adverseness in Chal-
lenges of Tax Exemptions for Discriminatory Private Schools, 52 FORDHAM L. REv. 441, 462-64 
(1984) (describing the Court's actions in Bob jOTUS as an attempt to legislate on a po-
litically controversial issue when there was no longer a need for judicial resolution). 
Ne\'ertheless, the political cost of granting a tax break to Bob Jones University was too 
much for the Reagan administration. Consequently, after announcing its plan to re-
store Bob jones University's tax-exempt status (and petitioning the Supreme Court to 
moot the school's challenge to the government's earlier denial of tax-exempt status), 
the administration once again reversed course-this time asking the Justices to appoint 
counsel to defend the government's earlier practice of denying tax breaks to racist 
schools. !d. Rather than grant this request, the Court should have forced the admini-
stration to bear the costs of a politically unpopular decision. 
117 As a matter of pure politics, presidents have always found that the benefits of 
agreeing to the legislative veto--expansive delegations of power-have always out-
weighed the costs-conditions on the exercise of delegated power. See generally Fisher, 
supra note 96, at 277-84 (noting several presidents who have agreed to legislative vetoes 
as a condition on delegated authority). For this reason, the 'White House had much to 
gain in seeking the judicial invalidation of the legislative veto. 
11
" This, after all, is the logic of Goldwater v. CaM, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (1979) ("The 
Judicial Branch should not decide issues affecting the allocation of power between the 
President and Congress until the political branches reach a constitutional impasse."), 
and other cases denying lawmakers standing to challenge executive branch decision-
making. With respect to the legislative veto, the President could take his complaint to 
Conr,ess simply by refusing to enforce or to sign bills with legislative veto prO\isions. 
1 
•• It is also possible that the Court sought to resolve the dispute and expound on 
public constitutional ''alues. 
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power to independently interpret the Constitution support both the 
sua sponte raising of the 1968 statute and the appointment of counsel 
to defend the constitutionality of the statute.120 But, much more than 
the separation of powers is at stake in Dickerson. A decision forbidding 
the courts' consideration of legal theories not raised by the litigants 
would cast doubt on the rule of law. 
Let me explain. The rule of law is anchored in the belief that law 
is binding (especially on the sovereign) and, consequently, that the 
administration of law must conform with the declared rule. 121 By 
authoritatively settling what is to be done, the rule of law fosters "the 
virtues of reliance, predictability, and stability[, and] by reducing vari-
ance in individual cases," the rule of law allows both individuals and 
government officials to plan their lives.122 Needless to say, the law is 
subject to interpretation. Furthermore, executive officials, especially 
prosecutors, possess significant discretion in administering the law. At 
the same time, the rule of law presupposes that an independent judi-
ciary will base its decisionmaking on the law, not the policy priorities 
of the executive branch.123 
Imagine the alternative, that is, a regime in which the parties to a 
dispute define the "law." Courts, lacking the power to independently 
look to the governing law, would rule under the terms and conditions 
of the parties who pursue litigation. Most of the time, one or the 
other party will have real incentives to call attention to the governing 
law. That, of course, is the premise of the adversarial system, namely, 
that the parties to a dispute will seek to advance their cause by advanc-
ing all pertinent legal arguments that support their position. Some of 
120 By taking the 1968 law into account, the courts also gave meaning to Congress's 
Article I power to legislate rules of evidence. See supra note 67 (contrasting Congress's 
lawmaking power with the judiciary's power to "say what the law is"). 
121 See generally LON L. FuLLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33-41,81-91 (1964) (discuss-
ing the importance of congruity between the rules as announced and their actual ad-
ministration). "Rule must be by law and not discretion" so that "the lawmaker itself 
must be under the law." Allan C. Hutchinson & Patrick Monahan, Democracy and the 
Rule of Law, in THE RULE OF LAW: IDEAL OR IDEOLOGY 97, 101 (Allan C. Hutchinson & 
Patrick Monahan eds., 1987); see also Ian Shapiro, Introduction, in THE RULE OF LAw I, 
5, 10 n.4 (Ian Shapiro ed., 1994) (discussing how judges decide cases based on black 
letter law as well as other legal standards). 
122 Macedo, supra note 40, at 154; see also Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On 
Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HAR.v. L. REv. 1359, 1371-81 (1997) (dis-
cussing the settlement function of law). 
123 See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing the influence of the execu-
tive branch upon the judiciary in light of the separation of powers doctrine). Of 
course, to faithfully execute the law, the executive must interpret the law and, in so 
doing, may look for ways to integrate its policy priorities into the law. 
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the time, however, neither party will have incentive to call the govern-
ing law to the court's attention. This was true of Dickerson, Erie, and, to 
. M bu 124 0 th . a certam extent, an ry. n o er occaswns, moreover, a party 
quite willing to raise an issue will not. This may be a result of bad law-
yering or the simple failure to realize that the court is interested in, 
say, reconsidering a longstanding interpretation of the Constitution 
or some federal statute. This was true in Independent Insurance Agents 
as well as a host of cases where courts have looked to amicus briefs 
125 
and other sources to glean the appropriate legal standard to apply. 
The costs of leaving it to opposing counsel to call the governing 
law to the court's attention cannot be overestimated. In such are-
gime, precedent would give way to party arguments-so that the law 
would no longer act as a stabilizing force. 126 Furthermore, an inde-
pendent judiciary would no longer see to it that the sovereign oper-
ated within the rule of law; instead, it would be up to opposing coun-
sel to call the governing law to the court's attention. Take the 
Dickerson case. For more than thirty years, the Justice Department 
steered clear of the 1968 statute. As such, there was little reason to 
think that the Department would employ (what all, including the Su-
preme Court, recognized to be) "the statute governing the admissibil-
ity of confessions in federal prosecutions."127 Far more significant, had 
some prosecutor pursued the 1968 statute and prevailed, the Justice 
121 See supra text accompanying notes 2-4 (discussing instances in Dickerson where 
both sides ignored the 1968 statute); supra text accompan}ing notes 54-55 (discussing 
Erie where both sides deliberately neglected to call for the overruling of Swift). In Mar-
bury, Madison chose to thumb his nose at the Federalist Supreme Court by ignoring 
the lawsuit. See DONALD DEWEY, MARsHALL V. jEFFERSON: THE POUTICAL 
BACKGROUND OF MARBURY 1: MADISON 96-99 (1970). Consequently, the issue of the 
Court's jurisdiction to issue Marbury a writ of mandamus was not challenged by either 
party to the litigation. For further discussion, see supra notes 32, 49, 50 and accompa-
nyi~~. text. 
Indep. Ins. Agents v. Clarke, 955 F.2d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1992), rev'd on other grounds, 
508 U.S. 439 (1993) (listing Teague v. Lane and Mapp v. Ohio, as examples of cases 
where the Supreme Court looked to amicus briefs); see also supra text accompanying 
notes 75-78 (listing Independent Insurance Agents and the possible negative effects of 
making a ruling based on something other than the law). 
126 Imagine the following hypothetical: The Supreme Court overrules Miranda in a 
1995 decision. The Clinton Justice Department, however, thinks that decision incor-
rect and, consequently, continues to utilize Miranda. Should a lower federal court 
judge (undoubtedly aware of the 1995 decision) pretend the new rule doesn't exist 
because neither party raises it? If the answer to this question is no-lower court judges 
must adhere to Supreme Court precedent-is there any principled reason to distin-
guish the above facts from the situation in Dickerson, namely, the efforts of litigants to 
treat duly enacted, presumably constitutional, nonwaivable legislation as a nullity? 
127 United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 511 U.S. 350,351 (1994). 
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Department would be under no obligation to treat that decision as 
binding precedent. Rather, assuming that the criminal defendant 
agreed, the Department (simply by refusing to mention the statute) 
could demand that the courts adhere to Miranda in subsequent cases. 
Indeed, the Justice Department and criminal defendants could stipu-
late that the governing standard is something altogether different 
than either Miranda or the 1968 statute. In other words, the rule of 
law would be replaced by the rule ofmen.128 
My point here is not that the rule of law presupposes that courts 
see themselves as an expositor of norms, nor as resolvers of individual 
disputes.129 It is, instead, that courts should not knowingly apply the 
wrong legal standard. When an issue is squarely before the court (as 
was the admissibility of Dickerson's confession), courts must look to 
the law, not just the arguments of the parties before it.1i!O In other 
words, notwithstanding our commitment to the adversarial system, 
there must be enough play in the joints that [a federal court] need not 
render judgment on the basis of a rule of law whose nonexistence is ap-
parent on the face of things, simply because the parties agree upon it-
128 In Dickerson, the rule of men (adherence to Miranda irrespective of the constiru-
tionality of the 1968 starute) was more protective of the criminal defendant than the 
rule of law (adherence to the 1968 starute unless that starute was found unconstiru-
tional). In another case, however, the rule of men might be less rights-protective than 
the rule of law. For example, proposed legislation would require federal courts to or-
der DNA testing from the crime scene, at government expense if the accused cannot 
pay for it. James Q. Wilson, WhatDeath-PenaltyE17()TS?, N.Y. TIMES,July 10,2000, atA19. 
Under the rule of law, a federal court would be obligated to order such testing irre-
spective of whether counsel for the accused made a request for such testing. 
129 I therefore disagree with scholarly efforts to link the rule of law to the "public 
values" model of litigation. See, e.g., Matthew Diller & Nancy Morawetz, Intradrcuit 
Nonacquiescence and the Breakdown of the Rule of Law: A Response to Estreicher and Revesr., 99 
YALE LJ. 801, 803-04 (1990) (asserting that the judicial branch's ability to establish a 
rule of law enables the branch to serve as an expositor of norms). Consider, for exam-
ple, the rule of law demand that a court must first satisfY itself that it has jurisdiction 
before it addresses the merits of a dispute. For a proponent of the "dispute resolution" 
model, the rule oflaw is honored by treating jurisdiction as a very real constraint on a 
court's power to "say what the law is." In contrast, proponents of the "public values" 
model would treat jurisdiction as a de minimis constraint on the judiciary's power to 
speak to the merits. 
130 This is especially true when Congress has enacted legislation prohibiting parties 
from waiving a legal theory in support of their claim. By mandating judicial considera-
tion of that legal theory, Congress-consistent with its supervisory powers over the fed-
eral courts-has defined which legal issues should be before the court. Of course, as 
was true in Dickerson, a court can claim that Congress acted unconstirutionally. But it 
cannot claim that principles of judicial economy prevent it from sua sponte consider-
ing matters that neither party raised in their filings. See supra notes 32, 51, 129 and ac-
companying text (arguing that the judiciary's raising of sua sponte issues conforms to 
the "dispute resolution" model of litigation). 
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particularly when the judgment will reinforce error already prevalent in 
the system.131 
283 
Judges, then, should look to party filings, their own knowledge of 
the law, the research of their law clerks, amicus filings, and the like, to 
inform themselves. And when statutory language mandates judicial 
consideration of an issue or when the court is convinced that the par-
ties before it are seeking a decision on something other than the law, 
judges must be willing to frustrate party expectations by grounding 
their decision in "the law," not in party arguments.132 By "saying what 
the law is," judges will honor both their Article III independence and 
the rule of law.133 In so doing, the courts will be able to perform their 
most important task-legitimating the actions of elected government. 
m United States v. Burke, 504 U.S. 229, 246 (1992) (Scalia,J., concurring). For 
this reason, I think that D.C. Circuit judge Laurence Silberman goes too far in calling 
for court decisionmaking to (almost always) be limited to party arguments. See Indep. 
Ins. Agents of America, Inc. v. Clarke, 955 F.2d 731, 741-44 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (Silber-
man, dissenting) (arguing that courts are not self-directed boards of legal inquiry), 
rro'd on other grounds, 508 U.S. 439 (1993); United States v. Pryce, 938 F.2d 1343, 1353 
(1991) (Silberman,]., dissenting in part) ("We thus ordinarily have no right to con-
sider issues not raised by a party in either briefing or argument, both because our sys-
tem assumes and depends upon the assistance of counsel, and because of the unfair-
ness of such a practice to the other party." (citations omitted)). 
m For this reason, the decision to sua sponte raise § 3501 in Dickerson was proper, 
not simply permissible. At the same time, to ensure that judges operate within the rule 
oflaw, it is imperative that judges limit those occasions on which they sua sponte raise 
legal arguments. The types of cases where courts should sua sponte raise arguments 
not considered by the parties are jurisdictional issues, matters on which Congress has 
mandated that parties cannot waive a particular legal claim, and issues of statutory 
construction where there is reason to doubt the continuing validity of the underlying 
statute. Beyond these categories, courts should only raise a legal theory to prevent 
themselves from knowingly grounding their decisions in the wrong legal standard. 
Even within these categories, judges should exercise some restraint. For example, 
judges should be especially cautious about sua sponte raising issues that they consider 
close questions. In part, a truly adversarial presentation will facilitate their resolution 
of such disputes. Furthermore, the more willing judges are to raise such issues, the 
greater the risk that judges will see their power to decide cases as part and parcel of an 
unbounded commission to expound on the meaning of federal law. See Kamen v. 
Kemper Fin. Servs., Inc. 500 U.S. 90, 97 n.4, 99 (1991) (leaving "for another day" one 
antecedent legal issue not raised by the parties while resolving another antecedent le-
gal issue as part of its "power to identify and apply the proper construction of govern-
ing law"). By limiting themselves this way,judges will be constrained by the rule oflaw. 
In contrast, an open-ended rule which allows judges to raise whatever legal arguments 
they find of interest would risk transforming the rule of law into a judge-dominated 
ruleofman. 
13~ I do not mean to suggest here that federal court judges have a duty to search 
out all relevant law on each and every legal issue that they confront. Limitations in 
judicial resources would make such an undertaking impossible. But, when confronted 
\\ith relevant law, judges cannot avert their eyes and look only to party arguments. 
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"What a government of limited powers needs, at the beginning and 
forever, is some means of satisfying the people that it has taken all 
steps humanly possible to stay within its powers."134 
In Dickerson, the Justice Department claim that Miranda, not the 
1968 statute, is the standard governing the admissibility of confessions 
has now been validated by the Supreme Court. In other words, by sua 
sponte raising the 1968 statute and by appointing counsel to defend 
the statute, the judiciary has legitimated this Justice Department posi-
tion. In contrast, a decision steering clear of the 1968 statute, because 
neither party invoked it, would have cast doubt on this Justice De-
partment position. More fundamentally, such a decision would sug-
gest that the President-at least sometimes-is not bound by the law. 
Of course, the Supreme Court could have upheld the 1968 stat-
ute. Had this occurred, the President might well have resisted the 
Court (and Congress) by continuing to utilize the Miranda standard. 
Even here, however, the Constitution would be made more vibrant 
and stable. The logic of our system of checks and balances, as Alex-
ander Bickel wrote, is that "the effectiveness of the whole depends on 
[each branch's] involvement with one another ... even if it often is 
the sweaty intimacy of creatures locked in combat. "135 More to the 
point, by exercising his power of presidential review, the meaning of 
the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination would play out 
in a dialogue between the branches and the people. For example, by 
continuing to argue that Miranda is the appropriate benchmark, the 
executive could press its case to the courts-to reconsider their rul-
ing-to the Congress-to repeal the 1968 statute-and to the peo-
ple-to use the ballot box and other mechanisms to support Miranda. 
CONCLUSION 
The separation of powers and the rule of law both support the sua 
sponte raising of the 1968 statute and appointment of counsel to de-
fend the statute. While a desire to undo Miranda may have been the 
motivation for all this, 136 it is nevertheless true that a court committed 
to judicial restraint would have followed a similar course. Just as a 
president must independently interpret the Constitution, courts must 
134 CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT 52 (1960). 
135 ALExANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAsT DANGEROUS BRANCH 261 (1962). 
136 See supra notes 10-16, 102 and accompanying text (discussing the Fourth Cir-
cuit's motivation to sua sponte consider the 1968 statute). 
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exercise their power to "say what the law is."137 Otherwise, our tripar-
tite system of government and, with it, our commitment to the rule of 
law will collapse. 
137 Article I values are also implicated; in particular, Congress's supervisory power 
over the rules of evidence. See supra note 120 (discussing Congress's lawmaking 
power). 
